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DIGEST OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS
REPORTED IN JANUARY, 1893.
[From the ist to the i 5 th of January.]
CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2, 4. PROPERTY, 4.
COMMERCIAL LAW.
Cases seleded by FRANCIS H. BOHLEN.
AGENCY.
i. Authority-Usage and Custom.
Where, in response to a telegram from an agent for the sale of fruits,
asking a price, the principals, in reply, merely state a price, they are
bound by a sale made by the agent at the price named, though not con-
firmed by them, and though their prior instructions to the agent only
authorized him to sell subject to their confirmation; there being a custom
or usage of the business to the effect that such a telegram is authority for
the agent to sell finally and unconditionally, notwithstanding his prior
instructions. Cawthorn v. Lusk, Supreme Court of Alabama, Nov. 9,
1892. HEAD, J., ix So. Rep., 731.
BILS AND NOTES.
2. Consideration-Collateral Security for Pre-existing Debt-
Bona Fide Holder.
Where negotiable paper is transferred to secure a pre-existing debt,
in consideration of an extension of the time of payment of the debt, the
transferee is a bona fide holder for value, and i% not subject to equities
between prior parties, of which he had no notice.
In such a case notes afterward substituted by mutual agreement of
the parties, without any new consideration, to take the place of the col-
lateral originally taken, will be held in the same condition as the collat-
eral whose place it took. First Nat. Bank v. Johnston, Supreme Court of
Alabama, THORINGTON, J., November 3, 1892, n1 So. Rep., 69o.
In Alabama the rule is that the holder of a negotiable instrument as
security for pre-existing indebtedness is not bona fide holder for value
(Wagner v. Simmons, 61 Ala., 143), unless there is some other considera-
tion as here, the extension of time.
So among others in Pennsylvania (9t Pa., 339), New York (Codding-
ton v. Bay, 20 Johns., 637), and Missouri (i9 Mo., io6).
The opposite view is held in England (Nisa v. Currie, L. R., I App.
Cas., 554), the Federal courts iSwift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, i; 102 U. S.,
25), and many States (Maryland, Indiana, etc.).
CONTRACTS.
3. Breach of-Conhact for Work and Laboi-Remedy.
A lithographic company contracted with a manufacturing company to
make in the course of the year certain designs and sketches of its trade-
COMMAERCIAL LAW.
marks and plant, and to engrave same on stationery. Such contract is
not contract of sale, but for work and labor, being to manufacture articles
of special value to the manufacturing company, but useless to others;
articles whose value is derived from the labor and skill bestowed on them
and not from the materials used. In such contracts time is not ordinarily
of the essence, and a failure to perform within stipulated time will not
justify the aggrieved party-in repudiating the entire contract, but merely
gives him an action for damages for breach of stipulation.
In contracts for the sale of marketable articles time of shipment is a'
part of description of subject-matter, and is condition precedent on fail-
ure or non-performance of which the entire contract may be repudiated.
See Norrington v. Wright, II5 U. S., 188. Beck & Pauli Co. v. Colorado
Co., Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth District, SANBORN, J., Qctober 31,
1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 700. "
4. Impflied-Parent and Child-Payment for Services.
The law will not imply a promise to pay for services rendered by a
son to an old and infirm parent, which, if rendered to a stranger, would
raise an implied promise to pay. To entitle the son to compensation
an express contract must be shown, or the circumstances be such as to
show that it was the intention of both parties that compensation should
be made and that the services were not performed from filial piety alone.
So if the father, having agreed to leave his home to his son, if the son
would reside with and care for him, and owing to an attack of insanity
the father could not carry out his promise. the son having carried out
his undertaking may recover on the express contract, the quantum
reruit being the measure of damages he is entitled to receive: Hudson
v. Hudson, Supreme Court of Georgia, LUMPKIN, J., November 21,
1892, 16 S. R. Rep., 349.
s. Proposals for Bids-Liability to Bidder.
A company making proposals for bids for building is not liable to
lowest bidder for not awarding contract to him or any other bidder but
doing the work itself, there being no promise to give cdntract to lowest
bidder, but only to award it to lowest bidder, if at all: Reusch v. Brew-
ing Co., Supreme -Court of Louisiana, BRXAUX, J., December 19, 1892,
ii So. Rep., 719.
SALE.
6. When Title Passes-Priority of Mortgage.
Where logs, sold on contract for delivery at a specified place, were
not cut when the contract was made, the title thereto does not pass until
after delivery, and a mortgage thereof before delivery will hold the same
as against such purchaser: N. P. Lumbering Co. v. K uron, Supreme
Court of Washington, DUNBAR, J., November 18, 1892, 31 Pac. Rep.
7. Conditional Sale-Right to Reclaim I'rofierly-Acion for
Price.
Plaintift's intestate sold certain machinery, taking a note from the
vendee under an agreement that, on default of payment, the vendor
might reclaitm the machinery and remove it, and, if any portion of the
OCONSTITUTIONAL. LAW.
note should remain unpaid when possession should be so taken, then the
amount which had been paid should be considered payment for the use
of the machinery by the vendee, and the note should be canceled. Held,
that the vendor could not adopt both remedies against the vendee, and
that bringing an action on the note barred the right to reclaim the prop-
erty: Crompton v. Beach, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,
FENN, J., April I, 1892, 25 AtI. Rep., 446.
8. Sale of Land-Reco'ery of Purchase Money Paid-Statute of
Frauds.
Money delivered under a contract for the sale of lands, which is void
under the statute of frauds, is held by the vendor as money had and
received for the use of the purchaser, and no previous claim by the pur-
chaser can bar its recovery: Nelson v. Shelby Co., Supreme Court of
Alabama, November 2, 1892, COLEMAN, J., II So. Rep., 695.
9. Statute of Frauds-Insffcient Memorandum.
A memorandum which sets out the terms of payment under a con-
tract of sale as " one-third cash, and 'notes to be executed for the bal-
ance,' " is not sufficient to bind the vendor, in that there is nothing
therein to show the number of notes to be given, interest therein, or date
of payment. The Alabama code requires in contracts for the sale of
land a memorandum of consideration signed by the party to be charged:
Nelson vz. Shelby Co., Supreme Court of Alabama, November 2, 1892,
COLEMAN, J., ir So. Rep., 695.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by WrLLIAM! STRUTHERS ELLIS.
FEDERAL.'
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
I. Original Packages-State Regulation.
The legislature of North Carolina, by Chapter 331 of the Acts of
189i, made it a misdemeanor for any persons doing business in the State
to sell seed, etc., without plainly marking upon each bag or package
containing the same the year in which the seed was grown-with a
proviso excepting farmers selling seed in open bulk to other farmers or
gardeners. Seed contained in packages not so marked was, in pursuance
of a contract, shipped by a citizen of Michigan to a citizen of North
Carolina, who sold it in the original packages to purchasers in the latter
State. He was convicted under the above statute and presented an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the statute was
unconstitutional as being a regulation of interstate commerce. Held,
that since the traffic in seed is a subject in its nature national, requiring
one uniform rule or plan of regulation, the inaction or silence of Con-
gress is evidence of its intention that the commerce shall beuntrammeled,
During the temporary absence of Mr. Ellis the cases for this
(February) number have been selected and abstracted by one of the
Editors.
CONSTITUTIONAL IAW.
and the act in question, therefore, contravenes the commercial clause of
the United States Constitution: In re Sanders. Circuit Court E. D.
N. C., GoFp, Circ. J., November 14, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 802.
2. Foreign Cor~arations-State Regulations-Interstate Com-
mnerce.
A foreign corporation entered into a contract with a citizen of the
State to sell goods to him at certain stipulated prices on credit, a bond,
upon which the defendant was surety, being given to the corporation to
secure payment for goods which might be sold under the contract. The
corporation had not complied with the Act of the Arkansas Legislature
of April 4, 1887, providing that before any foreign corporation shall begin
business in the State it shall file a certificate in the office of the secretary
of State designating an agent on whom process may be served, and stating
its principal place of business in the State; and providing, further, that
a failure to comply with these requirements shall avoid contracts with
citizens of the State. In a suit by the corporation to recover on the bond,
it was held that the transactions of the parties were acts of interstate
commerce, and could not be affected by the Act of legislature. Gunn v.
White Sewing Machine Co., Supreme Court of Arkansas, BATTrE, J.
(COCKRILr, C. J., and. MANSFiELD, J., dissenting) December 3, 1892, 20
S. W. Rep., 591.
3. Inspection Laws of States- Taxation of Imports-Powers of
Federal Courts-Police Power.
By Chapter 9, Public Laws of North Carolina, 1891, the legislature o
that State imposed a tax of twenty-five cents per ton upon fertilizers to
defray the expenses of inspection. Held, that this was, in effect, a law
to provide for the security of purchasers in buying articles whose con-
tents and qualities cannot be determined by ordinary inspection, and that
whether it be called an inspection law or an exercise of the general
police power of the State, it was constitutional, although imposed upon
things not grown or produced in the State enacting it. Such a tax is not
in itself so unreasonable or excessive as to evidence an intent to evade
the prohibition of the Federal Constitution upon the taxation of imports
by the States: Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North
Carolina, Circuit Court, Eastern District of North Carolina, SB-MOUR,
D. J., September 24, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 69o.
STATE.
ATTORNnYS.
4. Occupation Tax-License to Practice.
Section i, Article 8, of the Constitution of Texas authorizes the
legislature to impose taxes on the occupation of natural persons and
corporations "doing business in the State. . . . Persons engaged in
mechanical and agricultural pursuits shall never be required to pay an
occupation tax." Under this authority the legislaturb may impose an
occupation tax on lawyers and subject them to criminal prosecution and
fine for practicing without paying the tax and taking out a license. Such
a tax is constitutional, as lawyers are not constitutional officers, their
CORPORATIONS.
office being for life; and even if they were they would be taxable, since
the State has a right to tax the salaries and compensation of her own
officers. Nor is the tax a violation of the provision that the accused shall
have the right to be heard by himself or counsel; nor does such a tax
violate the constitutional provision that all taxes shall be equal and
uniform, since all members of the profession are alike subjected to it.
A license to practice is, indeed, a vested right, but unless there is some-
thing in the privilege by which the State has relinquished the right of
taxation, it is presumed that the license was accepted subject to the
power of the State to impose the tax, and therefore the act in question
does not impair the obligation of contract. Ex parle Williams, Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas, SImKINS, J., November I9, 1892, 20 S. IV.
Rep., 58o.
LEGISLATURE.
s. Legislative Finding of Fac-Review by Judiciary.
Section 3r, Article 6, of the Constitution of Missouri, gives the
general assembly power to establish criminal courts in counties having
a population exceeding fifty thousand. By an Act of assembly such a
court was created for Greene County, and a prisoner was convicted
therein. On an application for a habeas corpus he contended that the
court had no legal existence, since the census of I89O, taken before the
passage of the Act, and the census of 189o, taken thereafter, showed that
the population of the county was less than fifty thousand. Held, that
where, as here, the legislature has determined a question of fact upon
which its power to enact a given law is dependent, such finding of fact
will not be investigated by the judiciary in a collateral proceeding.
Renfrow v. Day, Supreme Court of Missouri, BRACE, J., December 12,
1892, 20 S. IV. Rep., 682.'
CORPORATIONS.
Cases selected by JOHN A. MCCARTHY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAXV, 2, 3. PRACTICE, 4.
INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS.
I. Trust Fund Theory-Preferred Credilor's.
Proceedings to foreclose a deed of trust executed by an insolvent
corporation in favor of its president and three directors to secure bonafide
advances, was resisted by a judgment-creditor, junior to the deed, as
being fraudulent as to him. It was held : (I) In the absence of statute
prohibiting it a corporation in failing circumstances may make prefer-
ences among its creditors by assigning all or a part of its property to
preferred creditors or to trustees for their benefit. The deed was, there-
fore, valid as a preference. (Following ex" parte Conway, 4 Ark., 302;
Ringo v. Biscoe, 13 Ark., 563.) (2) While it is undoubtedly true that
the property of a corporation is in one sense a trust fund for the payment
I See Vanfleet on Collateral Attack, Section 20 (Callaghan & Co.,
Chicago, 1892, reviewed infra, p. 184).
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
of its debts, yet this means no more than that the property of the cor-
poration cannot be distributed among its stockholders or applied to any
purpose foreign to the legitimate business of the corporation until its
debts are paid. The accident of a director being a bonafide debtor of the
corporation does not affect the application of the general rule. kFollow-
ing Fogg v. Blair, 133 U. S., 534, io Sup. Ct. Rep., 338; Graham v. R. R.,
102 U. S., 148-161.) (3) The deed is not void because made in favor of
the directors and president of the road when it is shown that their ad-
vances were bona fide and apparently the only source of the corporation's
credit (Following Hallam v. Hotel Co., 56 Ia., 178, 9 N. W. Rep., Iii;
Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn., 47; Duncombe v. R. R., 84 N. Y., 19o;
Reichwald v. Hotel Co., io6 Ill., 439; Richardson's Excr. v. Green, 133
U. S., 439, 1o Sup. Ct. Rep., 280). Gould v. Little Rock, etc., Railway
Co., Circuit Court of United States for Afkansas, October 28, 1892, 52
Fed. Rep.,, 68o.
PRINCIPAL OFFICE.
2. Taxation.
A steamship company engaged in traffic on the lakes had an office
outside of the city of Milwaukee, in the town of Lake, where there was a
sign with the name of the corporation thereon, and at which the annual
election of officers was held. No other business was transacted at this
office. The piesident and secretary of the company carried on an insur-
ance business as partners in Milwaukee. The company's books were
kept at their office, and through it all the business and financial affairs
of the company were transacted. "It was held that for the purposes of
municipal taxation the principal office of the company was in the city of
Milwaukee and its property was properly assessed therein: Milwaukee
S. S. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, December
6, 1892, 53 N. V. Rep., 839.
CRIMINAL LAW.
- Cases selected by C. PERCY WiLLcox.
BURGLARY. See CRIMfiNAL PRACTICE, 1, 2.
PERJURY.
I. Essentials of..
If the Court have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action, and
power to administer an oath to a witness therein, a false statement made
by him under oath will constitute perjury, even though the jury in such
action have not been properly sworn: Smith v. State, Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas, December 3, 1892, per HART, P. 3., 20 S. IV. Rep., 708.
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
Cases selected by C. PERCY WILLcOX.
INDICTMENT.
i. Sufficiency-Allegation as to Time.
Where an indictment for burglary, in the usual form, alleges thatthe
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
offense was committed on a certain day, "about the hour of twelve
o'clock in the night of that day," it clearly means in the night after sun-
down of that day, and is sufficiently certain as to time.
2. Sufficiency-Confortnity with Statute.
A sheriffs office is a "house," within Pen. Code, Art. 704, which
defines the crime of burglary as being the entry of a "house" by force,
etc.; and hence an indictment which charges defendant with breaking
into the sheriff's office, and also into a vault therein, is sufficient, though
it does not use the precise language of the statute, and allege the sheriff's
office to be a house.
And where an indictment for burglary charges the theft of specific
articles, an averment that the breaking was done "with intent to commit
a theft" is sufficient, without setting out the essential elements of
theft. Bigham v. State, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, November
5, 1892, per SIMKINS, J., 20 S. W. Rep., 577.
3. Suffciency-Slatenent of Offense.
Although it is provided by the General Statutes of Connecticut that
"every person who shall wilfully injure any public building, house of
worship, college or schoolhouse, shall be fined," etc., yet a complaint
charging that a defendant did wilfully injure "a certain public building
and house of worship," although in the language substantially of the
statute, is insufficient in failing to show particularly the manner of the
injury; for it is a general rule of criminal pleading that every information
or indictment must contain a statement of all facts and circumstances
constituting the crime with particularity and certainty. It has been
stated in many cases that in an information for a statutory offense it is
sufficient to allege it in the words of the statute. But such statement is
never intended to be a relaxation of the general rule as above given,
because in all cases the offense must be set forth with clearness and all
necessary certainty to apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands
charged. State z. Costello, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,
June 3o, 1S92, per Andrews, C. J., 25 Atl. Rep., 477.
JUDGE.
4. Disqualification-Hostility to Defendant.
Previous to a second trial of defendant for murder he moved the
judge to retire from the bench, and not preside in the case, filing an affi-
davit that after the first trial the judge criticised to divers persons those
of the jury who favored defendant, and announced defendant's alleged
crime as the most bloodthirsty ever committed; that the judge knew that
there was a rabid and unhealthy feeling against defendant, and expressed
in the presence of crowds, and during an election campaign, in which
the judgeship was one of the contested offices, his opinion as to defendant's
guilt; and, being personally hostile to defendant, ruled so as to satisfy
the bloodthirsty crowd. Held, that the failure of the judge to vacate
was error: Massie '. Commonwealth, Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
December 13, 1892, per B=N.Vr;TT, J., 20 S. W. Rep., 704.
0EDIENCE.
NEw TRIAL.
s. Grounds-Misconduct ofJumy.
Upon the trial of an ihdictment for murder. After the case was sub-
mitted to the jury, some of the jurors were allowed to stand on the court-
house porch, where they could hear citizens discusing the merits of the
case, and insisting on defendant's guilt. Hfeld, that the facts set forth
were sufficient ground for setting aside a verdict of guilty, and granting
a new trial: Vaughan v. State, Supreme Court of Arkansas, December 3,
1892, per COCKRILL, C. J., 20 S. E. Rep., 588.
EQUITY.
Cases selected by ROBERT P. BRADFORD.
MORTGAGES. See COMMERCIAL LAW, 6.
i. Receiver of Rents and Profits.
It results from the fact that a mortgage is only a security for a debt
that a mortgagor in possession is to be treated as the owner of the prop-
erty. A receiver of the rents and profits will not, therefore, be appointed
unless their preservation is necessary to the mortgagee's security: Lind-
say v. American Mortgage Co. of Scotland, Supreme Court of Alabama,
HEAD, J., November 21, 1892, ii So. Rep., 770.
SUBROGATION.
2. Voluntary Payment.
M., the owner of a mortgage, loaned it to a bank for temporary use,
to sustain its credit 'hen in a financial strait. The bank pledged the
mortgage with a creditor as collateral security, and subsequently pledged
with the same creditor commercial paper, owned by it, as collateral secu-
rity for the same debt. Afterward the bank made a general assignment
for the benefit of creditors. The mortgagor then voluntarily paid the
amount of the mortgage to the pledgee, who applied the money toward
the debt of the-bank. The pledgee collected the commercial paper, and,
after full satisfaction, there remained a balance therefrom in the pledgee's
hands. Held: That by right of subrogation M. was entitled to this bal-
ance as against the voluntary assignee: Matthews v. Fidelity Title and
Trust Co., Circuit Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, ACHFSOx, J.,
August 4, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 687.
TRUSTS. See COMMERCIAL LAW, 8.
EVIDENCE.
Cases selected by ARDEMUS STEVART.
CONSPIRATORS, ACTS OF.
i. Conversation with Confederate.
On a prosecution for the theft of hogs, evidence by the State, show-
ing that defendant and a confederate agreed to get the hogs; that they
200
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together drove them six or seven miles to defendant's place, and put
them in his pen; and that they together disposed of them on the follow-
ing day, establishes a conspiracy, and renders admissible in evidence a
conversation between a third person and defendant's confederate, shortly
before the theft, in which he was informed as to the ownership of the
hogs, though such conversation did not take place in defendant's hearing :
Smith v. State, Court of Criminai Appeals of Texas, DAVIDSON, J., No-
vember 2, 1892, 2o S. W. Rep., 576.
MoTIvE.
2. Conviction for Similar Offences.
On a prosecution for assault with intent to murder, where the evi-
dence connecting defendant with the crime is purely circumstantial,
evidence of another assault, committed on the prosecuting witness by
defendant a few months before the one in question, and the record of
defendant's conviction for such assault, are admissible to prove motive:
Crass v. State, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, DAVIDSON, J., Novem-
ber 3o, 1892, 20 S. NV. Rep., 579.
OPINION.
3. Exfiert-Real Estate Broker- alue of Land.
In order to render the opinion of a witness competent evidence, he
must appear to have special knowledge on the subject of inquiry. An
ordinary real estate agent is not competent to give his opinion as evidence
upon the value of the private title in a strip of land lying in a public
highway, and separated by the street from private property; nor is such
an agent competent to give his opinion as evidence upon the damages
which should be paid to the owner of the abutting property on the con-
demnation of such a strip for railroad purposes: Laing v. United New
Jersey Railroad and Canal Co., Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey, DIXON, J., November 17, 1892, 25 Atl. Rep., 409.
RELLEVANCX'.
4. Res Geste-Exilanatory Statement.
In an action by a husband for alienation of the wife's affections it was
proper for defendant, as part of the res gestt, to show what the wife,
when exhibiting to her parents wounds and bruises claimed to have been
inflicted by the husband on occasions before or during her acquaintance
with defendant, had said of their effect upon her feelings toward the hus-
band, and what she had said also after leaving her husband's house for
that of defendant as to her fears of bodily injury, etc. Rudd v. Rounds,
Supreme Court of Vermont, Ross, C. J., August 25, 1892, 25 Atl. Rep.,
438.
5. A'es Gest-Facts Forming Part of.Same Transaction.
On a trial for assault with intent to kill, the prosecuting witness can-
not testify that he told the first persons who reached him after he was
shot who did it, as such conversation is not part of the res gest&-. Loyd
v. State, Supreme Court of Mississippi, COOPER, J., October 17, 1892, 1i
So. Rep., &9.
INSURANCE.
WITNESS.
6. Credibility of Witness-Habit of Drinking.
On a trial for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, the fact that a
witnegs is in the habit of drinking beer does not affect his credibility, and
the admission of evidence of that fact is error. People v. Kahler, Supreme
Court of Michigan, McGRATH, C. j, December 1, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep.,
826.
7. Refreshing Memory-Use of Documents.
Schedules of prices fixed by dealers from year to year, which prices
are the established prices in the trade, may be used by witnesses called
to state the fair retail price of goods sold, it being shown that it was
impossible for any one to carry the prices of all the articles in his mind.
Such evidence could not be excluded on the ground that it was not com-
petent to prove that plaintiff's prices were excessive except by persons in
the same line of business, since the question was whether the prices were
excessive, and any evidence proving the true value of the materials was
competent. Nelson et al. v. Columbian Iron Works and Dry Dock Co., of
Baltimore City, Court of Appeals of Maryland, BRYAN, J., November 18,
1892, 25 At. Rep., 417.
INSURANCE.
Cases selected by HORACE L. CHEYNEY.
FIRE INSURANCE.
OVER-INSURANCR.
i. Additional Policy Obtained through Mristake.
The plaintiff procured several olicies of insurance upon a building,
all of which provided that "$i5,ooo total concurrent insurance per-
mitted." One of these policies was dated October 28, 189o, and recited
that it was for a period of one year from that date, but stated by mistake
that it would expire on October 28, 189o. The insurance agents from
whom plaintiff obtained his insurance, misled by the recitals in the above
policy, and believing.,it to have expired, informed him, when they
delivered the policy in suit, that his total insurance was under the limit
by $2,500, the face of the policy erroneously supposed to have expired,
and, in reliance on such statement, plaintiff procured an additional
policy of $2,5oo. Held, that such additional policy, applied for and
obtained through such a mistake, did not vitiate the older insurance, but
that it is not itself collectible. Boulden v. Phenix Ins. Co., Supreme
Court of Alabama, STONE, C. J., November 3, t892, II So. Rep., 774.
PROVISIONS oF PoLICY.
2. Waiver by Agent Binding upion Company.
Where the agent of defendant insurance company, clothed with full
power to issue policies, and who was also the legal adviser of plaintiff,
and knew the condition of her property, procured and assented to the
placing of a chattel mortgage on the property, but did not indorse such
assent on the policy, the defendant insurance company is estopped from
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denying its liability under the policy; it being presumed to- have the
knowledge of its agent, even though the policy contained a provision
that it would be void if the property became incumbered by a chattel
mortgage, unless assent was indorsed thereon, and the further provision
that no agent had power to waive a provision or condition: Beebe v.
Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., Supreme Court of Michigan, LONG, J., December
3, 1892, 53 N. NV. Rep., 818.
MARINE INSURANCE.
T.TAx, Loss.
3, Abandonment-Jettison of Cargo.
Under a marine policy insuring against "absolute loss only," a
partial loss cannot not be converted into a constructive total loss, and
evidence of abandonment is immaterial, and a jettison of cargo, either
to lighten the ship or for the purpose of being saved, does not of itself.
constitute an "absolute total loss" within the meaning of a marine
insurance policy, when part of the goods are in fact saved. " Monroe v.
British and Foreign Marine Ins. Co., Limited, Circuit Court of Appeals of
United States, First Circuit, PUTNAm, J., October 5, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 777-
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
Cases selected by MAYNE R. LoNGsTRETH.
CITY ORDINANCES.
x. Validity.
A city ordinance which declares that it shall hereafter not be lawful
for anyone to set up or establish a private market for the sale of meats,
fish, vegetables, etc., "without permission of the city councils," but
which does not enumerate any requisites to obtain permission, is illegal
and void, because it is not general and impartial, and the discretion vested
by such ordinance in the city council is in no way regulated or controlled
by conditions upon which the permission shall be granted, leaving it
within the power of the council to grant or refuse the privilege at pleas-
ure, influenced by partisan, race and personal considerations: State v.
Dubarry, Supreme Court of Louisiana, December 19, 1892, 1i So. Rep.,
718. Based upon Yick Co. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356.
CouNcLs.
2. Consent to Use of Streets by Electric Railways.
Where a city by an ordinance of councils consents to the operation of
a street railway by overhead electric wires, and the company owning the
railway is especially named in the ordinance, but the company to which
the railway is leased for a term of years is not mentioned, the consent of
the city to the use of electricity as a motor to the lessee company is suffi-
ciently declared. In such a case the consent of councils was that the
thing should be done by two corporations acting together as one, and
such consent, whether it named one or the other, was meant to be opera-
tiv. as to both: Reeves v. Philadelphia Traction Co., Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, MITcELL, J., January 3, 1893, 152 Pa. St., 153; 31 W. N.
C., 265.
PATENTS.
ELECTIONS.
3. Promulgating Election Returns.
The duties of the Secretary of State in promulgating the returns of
the election are purely and exclusively ministerial, and he has no discre
tion whatever to question the accuracy of the clerk's certificate, to vary
or contradict it, but must promulgate from the official returns certified to
as correct by the clerk, without changing a name or omitting returns
believed to be based on fraudulent and illegal voting: State v. Mason,
Supreme Court of Louisiana, McENERY, J., December 5, 1892, 11 So,
Rep., 711.
4. Use by Railroad Company.
The construction and operation of a railroad at grade in a public
street under municipal authority, is not a new use of the street for which
compensation may be demanded by abutting owners, as in the case of
property "taken or damaged" within the meaning of Art. II, Par. 21 of
the Constitution: Henry Gauss & Sons Manfg. Co. v. St. Louis, K. & U.
W. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Missouri, MACARLANZ, J., December is,
1892, 20 S. V. Rep., 658.
POLICE POWER.
5. Fire Limits.
A borough charter empowering its burgesses "to provide adequate
protection against fire " does not authorize the establishment of fire
limits within which the erection of-wooden structures may be prohibited.
Such restrictions are invasions of private right and can only be imposed
where the power has been expressly given: Pratt v,. Borough of Litch-
field, Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Connecticut, TORRANCE,
J., June 3o , 1892, 25 AtI. Rep., 461.
NoT.-The general rule in this country is that municipal corpora-
tions have the power, underthe general welfare clauses usually contained
in their charters, without express legislative grant, to establish fire limits
forbidding the erection of woodeii structures therein, as it is a power
connected with the purposes for which such corporations are organized :
Baumgartner v. Hasty, ioo -Ind., 575; Ford 'v. Thrailkell, 27 A. & E.
Corp. Cas., 576 Ga., 1889; Com. v. Tewksbury, ii Met., 55; King v.
Davenport, 98 Ill., 305; Exfpare Fiske, 72 Cal., i25; Mayor v. Hoffman,
29 La. Ann., 651; Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea., 121; Charleston v.'Reed, 27
W. Va., 68i. In a few States, however, the power to pass such ordinances
is held not to exist unless expressly given by the legislature: Des Moines
v. Gilchrist, 67 Va., 21o; Rye v. Peterson, 45 Tex., 312; State v,. Shuc-
hardt (La., 189o), 7 S. R., 67. In other States power to establish fire
limits is expressly or impliedly given by general municipal corporation
acts: Klinger v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St., 326; Ford v. Thrailkill, 27 A. & R.
Corp. Cas., 576 (Ga., 1889).
PATENTS.
MUTUAL RELATIONS.
PARENT AND CHILD. See COMMERCIAL LAW, 4.
PATENTS.
Cases selected by HECTOR S. FENTON.
ABANDONMENT OF PATENT.
i. Public Use by Inventor before Application.
The plaintiff, in the expectation of being employed by a railroad
company as engineer to construct a cable road, devised the system after-
ward patented to him in 1882, and actually constructed such a road in the
city of San Francisco in 1878, which was then successfully tested and
operated for profit; but doubts on his part as to its continued successful
operation, and the discovery by him in 1879 of supposed slight defects in
the structure, rendered him uncertain as to the success of the device until
1881, though he did not express these doubts and uncertainties to any
one, nor take any steps to remedy the supposed defects. Held, to be a
continued public use and not experimental and, therefore, constituting
an abandonment, sufficient time having elapsed to test the structure and
apply for a patent within the limit of two years after the road was laid:
Root v. Thifd Ave. Co. R. Co., Sup: Ct. U. S. (affirming C. C. U. S. So.
Dist. N. Y., 37 Fed. Rep., 673). Decided November 21, 1892, 13th Sup.
Ct. Rep., ioo.
DESIGN PATENTS.
2. Patentable Subject-matter.
Plaintiff conceived the idea of placing an old ornament upon an
album case of which he was not the inventor, the form the alleged
invention took being an album case set on a base board in an upright
position, having on its exterior an oval ornamental frame with an open
centre. Held, avoiding the patent, that Clause 3 of Sec. 4929, Rev. Stat.,
authorizing patents for designs, contemplated only designs for articles of
manufacture and for designs to be placed upon or worked into such
articles, and not for the mere placing of an ornament upon such articles:
Bergner v. Kaufmaun, So. Dist. N. Y., WHEELER, J., November 29, 1892,
52 Fed. Rep., 8M8.
INFRINGEMENT.
3. Bill for Pleading-Averment of Title-Allegation of Aron-
prior Use and Sale.
On demurrer to a bill for infringement which averred that "the
alleged invention had not bein in public use or on sale for more than two
years with his consent or allowance," and had set up title in the plaintiff
at a specific date without averring continued ownership of the patent at
the time of suit brought. Held, sustaining the demurrer, that the bill
was defective in both particulars: Krick v. Jansen, So. Dist. N. Y.,
TOwNSEND, D. J., August 25, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 823.
PATENTS.
4. Contributory-Procurement by Defentdant ofBreac ofLicetse
by Licensee.
Patentees had granted licenses to A and others to use patented
machines purchased of them; conditioned that the special material used
thereon should be purchased of the licensors. Defendant had procured
and induced A and other licensees to violate this condition by purchasing
such special. material of defendant to be used upon said machines. The
bill sought to charge the defendant with actively contributing to an
infringement, and prayed an injunction. Defendant demurred. De-
murrer overruled, and on motion for injunction, ienrdente lite, heard with
the demurrer: Held, that the defenses urged on behalf of the defendant
that the patentees' remedy was solely against his licensee,, as for breach
of contract; and that the restriction in the license was in restraint of
trade, and hence contrary to law in that itsought to establish in theplain-
tiff a monopoly in the sale of unpatented articles, viz.:' the special mate-
rial used upon the machines, were not tenable, and that the injunction
should be granted. Heaton Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v Dick et
al.,t United States Circuit Court, Ninth District of Illinois, JENIKINS, D. J.,
July, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 667. (An exhaustive collection of authorities is
appended to the report of this case.)
5. State of Art-Construction of Claimn-Novelly-M echanical
Skill.
In suit on two patents issued in sequence to the same patentee on
substantially the same generic device, the state of the prior art requiring
a narrow construction of the claims of the first patent: Held, that such
view is sustained by the patentee's declarations in the second patent dif-
ferentiating between the two. Held, also, that the specific form .of slot
claimed in the second patent to admit the passage of a known specific
form of staple, was not novel or patentable, it being obvious and requir-
ing mechanical skill only, to adapt the slot in charge to admit the staple:
Phila. Novelty Co. v. Weeks, So. Dist. N. Y., Coxr, J., December 2, 1892,
.52 Fed. Rep., 816.
6. State Statutes of Limitations.
An action at law % as brought more than three and less than six
years after the expiration of fhe patent alleged to have been infringed by
the defendant, who pleaded the State Statute of Maryland, barring
actions on the case after three years. On demurrer of the plea, Held, that
while the Court thought Section 72r, Rev. Stat., establishing limitations
in other cases applied to actions on patents, in view of recent previous
decisions to the contrary by courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, following
the doctrine of comity. overruled the demurrer: Briskill v. City of Balti-
more, U. S. Circuit Court, District of Maryland, November i. 1892,
MORRIS, D. 3., 52 Fed. Rep., 737.
7. Recision of-Intention.
After application filed and before patent granted, the plaintiff ex-
hibited to the defendant a machine said to represent the invention for
which the patent was applied and had then been allowed but not yet
PRACTICE.
issued. Defendant thereupon entered into a royalty contract reciting
these facts and granting, inter alia, to the defendants an exclusive license
to manufacture the invention for the term of the patent to be issued, the
licensee covenanting to pay a royalty semi-annually on all specimens of
the invention made and sold by him; and providing that if defendants
"shall decide at any time that they do not wish to continue the manu-
facture and sale of said (invention) then this contract, or any lease or
license issued under it, shall be surrendered to said (patentee) without
damage to either party." The defendant soon after made quite a number
of the patented machines. On the subsequent issue of the patent it was
found not to contain any claim for the essential feature which, as was
proven, had induced the defendant on the original examination of the
plow to enter into the contract. Defendants thereupon notified the pat-
entee that they would not proceed ,%ith the manufacture under the con-
tract. The patent after issue was assigned to the plaintiff, and no license
after such issue was ever given or offered to the defendant. Several
defenses were made, but the case turned upon failure of consideration
in that the patent subsequently issued did not protect defendant in the
exclusive manufacture of a device embodying the features exhibited in
the sample machine upon which the contract was made. In deciding the
case for the defendant the Court held that it was not necessary, in acting
under the surrender clause (quoted above), that the parties should act-
ually have manually surrendered and cancelled the paper contract, if the
conduct of the defenaant was such as to manifest a clear and unequiv-
ocal intention so to do. Hunt v. Moline Plow Co., United States Circuit
Court, Ninth District of Illinois, BLODGETT, DI. J., October 31, 1892, 52
Fed. Rep., 745.
LIcENse.
8. Royalties-Novation-Deli, ery of License- Waive-.
Plaintiff agreed to deliver to defendants certain patented machines,
together with a license reserving royalties, to use the same "themselves,"
or "by any other person for them or for others." Before delivery of the
machines defendants organized and became sole stockholders of a cor-
poration, to whom the machines, at defendant's request, were delivered.
Held, reversing the Court below, in an action to recover the royalties,
that the delivery to the corporation instead of to defendants did not
constitute a novation, and being done with defendant's consent, neither
extinguished the old obligation nor released the original debtors; nor
did it constitute a breach of the contract, since the consent of the
defendants as officers of the corporation estopped them from denying
that the delivery was against their consent and implied request. Held,
also, that the delivery of the machines under the contract to give a
license reserving royalties, did not prevent a recovery for the royalties,
notwithstanding that there'was no delivery of the paper license, the
omission being caused by the licensee's refusal or neglect to sign it.
American Paper Bag Co. v. Van Nortwick el al, U. S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, 7th Circuit, HARLAN, Circ. J., an,l Woo.; and JENKINS.
Decided October 1, 1992, 52 Fed. Rep. 752.
PRACTICE.
RE-issuE.
9. Afrew Element in Claim -Broadening Claim-" Same" In-
z'ention.
Where the original patent was re-issued with a claim containing a
new element introduced into the combination patented by one of the
claims, which ordinarily.would "narrow" the claim, held, in case of
re-issue the patent was not for "the same invention" within the meaning
of the statute, because the patentee must have described and intended to
secure in the original the invention claimed in the re-issue: and that in
legal contemplation the claim was "broadened" and is invalid if it
thereby covers machines that were or could have been for more than two
years previously used by innocent parties without infringement. Car-
penter Straw Sewing Machine Co. v. Searle, et al, So. Dist. of N. Y.,
CoxE, D. J., Nov. 15, 1892. 52 Fed. Rep., 8o9.
PLEADING.
Cases selected by ARDEmUS STEWART.
DECLARATION.
I. Sufficiency.
When a contract declared upon refers to another contract for its
terms, and the latter is not set out in the declaration, no action can be
maintained upon the former, and the declaration is demurrable: Toole .v
Baer, Supreme Court of Georgia, p5er curiam, December 6, 1892, 16 S. E.
Rep., 378.
PRACTICE.
Cases selected by ARDEMUS STEWART.
LAW.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD.
i. Validily-SuO6tission Pursuant to Church Rules.
(I) An arbitration and award are none the less binding because made
pursuant to the regulations of a church to which the parties belong.
(2) In a common-law submission to arbitration the arbitrators reed
not be sworn unless the parties demand it, and it will be presumed to
have been dispensed with if not required in the submission: Payne v.
Crawford, Supreme Court of Alabama, STONE, C. J., April 13, 1892, 11 So.
Rep., 725.
CERTIORARI.
2. " Review of Official -clion-Taxvation.
A taxpayer may prosecute a writ of certiorari to review any munici-
pal or official action which tends to burden his taxing district with a
debt. 22 AtI. Rep., 48r, reversed: State (Middleton, Prosecutor) v. Rob-
bins et at., Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, REED, J., Novem -
ber 20, 1892, 25 AtI. Rep., 471.
PRACTICE.
COURTS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.
3. Wlhen "In Session "-Fees of United Slates Mfarshal.
A circuit or district court is "in session," within the meaning of
Rev. St. P 829. fixing the marshal's compensation for attending same
"while in session," only when it is open by its own order for the trans-
action of business, and a marshal is not entitled, under such section, to
be compensated at the rate of five dollars per day for each day of the term
when the court by its own action is not open for the transaction of busi-
ness. 24 Ct. Cl., 394, affirmed: McMullen v. United States, Supreme
Court of the United States, HARLAN, J., December 5, 1892, 13 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 127.
JURISDICTION.
4. Federal Courts-Diverse Citizenship - Corporations.
Under Act August 13, 1888 (23 St. at Large, p. 433), i, providing
that, "where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action
is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the
district of the residence of either plaintiff or defendant," the Circuit
Court for the Southern District of California has no jurisdiction of such a
suit by a Missouri corporation against an Illinois corporation, although
the latter was organized for the purpose of doing business in the southern
district of California, and has its principal office there; and the fact that
defendant filed an answer on the merits would not authorize the mainte-
nance of such a suit, for this would be to give jurisdiction by consent in
a case not within the general jurisdiction of the Court: St. Louis Ry. Co.
v. Pacific Ry. Co., Circuit Court S. D. California, Ross, Dist. J., Novem-
ber 18, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 770.
RE OVAr, OF CAUSES.
5. Separable Controversy-Joint Defendants.
An action for wrongful arrest and imprisonment and for malicious
prosecution, instituted in a State court against two defendants jointly,
cannot be removed by either into the federal court, under Act March 3,
1875, Section 2, upon the ground of a separate controversy; and the fact
that the defendant seeking removal has filed separate defenses does not
make such cause of action separable: O' Harron v. Henderson, Circuit
Court Dist. of Indiana, BAKER, Dist. J., October IO, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep.,
769.
RpS JUDICATA.
6. J/fotion to Set Aside Default.
The denial of a motion to set aside a default is not res judicata, and
the motion may be renewed by leave first obtained on good cause shown.
Jensen v. Barbour, Supreme Court of Montana, DEWITT, J., November
28, 1892, 31 Pac. Rep., 592..
SUBIMONS.
7, Service-What Corstitutes.
A summons directed to the defendant was served upon another per-
son. The latter mailed to the defendant the copy served upon him, and
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the defendant received it by mail. Held, no service, and, judgment
having been entered on default, the defendant was entitled to set it aside
as void on motion, without showing a meritorious defense: Savings Bank
of St. Paul v. Arthur et al., Supreme Court of Minnesota, DICKINSON. J.,
December 27, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 812.
PROPERTY.
Cases selected by ALFRED RoLAND HAIG.
REAL PROPERTY.
See WILLS I, 2.
CONVERsIoN.
i. Effect of on Lien of Dower and Judgments.
Trustees, under a deed of trust, were directed "to bid in and purchase
at sheriffis sale any or all the real estate of one M., a debtor of the parties
to the deed of trust, if in their opinion it should become necessary in
order to secure the interests of said parties, and to take a deed or-deeds
therefor from the sheriff in the name of said trustees for the use of said
parties, upon trust to hold said lands for the purpose of making sale
thereof, and that said trustees will make sale as early as practicable for
the purpose of converting the same into money, at either public or private
sale, for such prices and on such terms as they shall deem best
and that said trustees will from time to time pay over to said parties the
proceeds of such sales, to be divided among them in proportion to their
several and respective interests in said judgment: Held, That the effect
of this agreement was to place the title of the real estate when purchased
in the trustees named for the purpose of sale; that this was a conversion,
and that the property purchased was not bound by the lien of judgments
against any of the beneficial parties, nlor by the dower of the vdves of
any of the cestuis que trustent, not parties to the agreement. Hunter v.
Anderson, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PAXSON, C. J., January 3,
1893, 31 W. N. C., 386.
DIED.
2. Conveydnce to Ofunipifalityfor Public Park.
A conveyance to the village of Moorhead, its successors and assigns,
in consideration of one dollar, of land "to be f6rever held and used as a
public park," does not pa s an absolute title so as to permit the erection
of a prison thereon by the grantee: Platen v. City of Moorhead, Supreme
Court of Minnesota, CoLLINs, J., December 8, 1892, 33 N. W. Rep., 807.
HOMESTEAD.
3. Severance of Exempt Homestead Building by Trespasser,
Effect of.
A building which is exempt from levy and sale as an appurtenant of
an exempt homestead does not lose its exempt character by the wrongful
severance thereof from the realty by a trespasser; but after a severance
the owner may sue for its conversion as personal property: Wylie v.
Grundysen, Supreme Court of Minnesota, VANDERBURGH, J., November
23, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 8o5.
WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
LATERAL SUPPORT.
4. Removal of, by Company-Eminent Domain.
Where a railroad company in constructing its right of way removes
by excavation the lateral support to adjoining land, such removal is a
taking, and the right so to appropriate can be acquired only by purchase
or condemnation: McCullough v. St. Paul, etc., Rwy. Co., Supreme
Court of Minnesota, GILFILLAN, C. J., December 17, 1892, 53 N. V.
Rep., 802.
PERSONAL PROPERTY.
See WiLLs, 4.
WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Cases selected by MAURicE G. BEI,.NAP.
CONSTRUCTION.
3. "Revert "-Contingent Remainder.
Where a testator devised land to his wife during widowhood, and
directed that at her death or marriage it should "revert" to his children
"according to the laws-of the State," and that at their death it should be
divided among their children," held, that if the word "revert" was used
technically in the will, testator's children tock a fee simple under the
statute of descents, and subsequent limitatiors over were void, while if
the word "revert" was used in the sense of "go to," testator's children
took a contingent remainder, which vested on the death of the widow,
and the subsequent limitation to the children of testator's children was
void because limited on a contingent remainder: Robinson v. Ostendorff,
Supreme Court of South Carolina, MCGOWAN, J., December I, 1892, 16
S. E. Rep., 371.
DEVISE.
2. Estate in Fee Simle-Limilation Over.
Testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife and "her heirs for-
ever," with the proviso that whatever of the same, if any, should be left by
her, not used for her support and comfort, should go to a certain church.
Held, that the gift to the wife was an express gift in fee which could
never be reduced to a life estate by implication, and that the limitation
over, therefore, to the church was void: Central Methodist Episcopal
Church v. Harris, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, CARPENTER,
J., June 30, 1892, 25 Atl. Rep., 456.
DISTRIBUTION.
3. French Spoliation Claims.
The Act of Congress of March 3, 189i, making appropriations to pay
claims for French spoliations prior to July 3I, i8oi, reported to Congress
by the Court of Claims, contained the proviso, "that in all cases where
the original sufferers were adjudicated bankrupts, the award shall be
made in behalf of the next of kin, instead of to assignees in bankruptcy,
and the awards, in the cases of individual claimants, shall not be paid
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until the Court of Claims shall certify to the secretary of the treasury-that
the personal representatives on whose behalf the award is made represent
the next of kin, and the. courts which granted the administrations
respectively shall have certified-that the legal representatives have given
adequate security for the legal disbursement of the awards." Held, that
it was not intended to make a direct gift to the next of kin, but a payment
to the estate of the original claimant which descended by the ordinary
course of distribution: In re Leffingwell's Estate, Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut, ANDRUWS,'C. J., November 21, 1892, 25 Atl. Rep.,
453.
LEGAcY.
4. Bequest of Stocks in Remainder-Right of Life Tenant to
Possession.
Where there is a bequest of money, pr stocks, or bonds in remainder,
the life tehant is generally not entitled to possession, the executor retain-
ing control, but this rule of construction will be disregarded if the oppo-
site intention is apparent from the entire will: Watkins' Ex'rs v.
Snadon, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, HOLT, C. J., December 5, 1892,
20 S. W. Rep., 700:
5. Description of Corpioration as Legatee.
A bequest to a corporation wilf not fail where there has been a mis-
nomer, if the description is sufficient with the aid of extrinsic evidence
to enable the Court to identify the legatee.with entire certainty. Moore's
Ex'r 7. Moore, Court of Chancery of New Jersey, VANFLrEET, V. C.,
"December 5, 1892, 25 Atl. Rep., 403.
6. * Geniral Legacy-Direction to Purchase Mortgage,
A direction to invest a certain sum of money in the purchase of a
particular mortgage is a general, not a specific, legacy: Moore's Ex'r v.
Moore, Court of Chancery of New Jersey, VANFLEET, V. C., December
5, 1892, 25 At. Rep., 403.
REVOcATIoN.
7. Statute Requiring Provision for Children-Evidence of Inten-
tion to Provide.
Where a statute providing that a testator shall be deemed to die
intestate as to such child or children not named or provided for in his
will, is construed not to compel a testator to make any substantial provi-
sion for his children, but simply to provide against any children being
disinherited through inadvertence of the testator at the time he makes
his will, extrinsic proof is admissible to show that the provision of a
testator's will devising all .his property to his "wife and to her heirs for-
ever" was intended by him as such a provision as would take the will out
of the operation of the statute: Bower v. Bower, Supreme Court of Wash-
ington, HOYT, J., November 18, 1892, 31 Pac. Rep., 598.
